The Connectionist Reply (as it might be called) is set forth—along with a recapitulation of the Chinese room argument and a rejoinder by Searle—by Paul and Patricia Churchland in a 1990 Scientific American piece. Is the human brain running a program? 希尔勒（John Searle）在1980年设计的一个思维试验以推翻强人工智能（机能主义）提出的过强主张：只要计算机拥有了适当的程序，理论上就可以说计算机拥有它的认知状态以及可以像人一样地进行理解活动。 The Chinese Room argument was developed by John Searle in the early 1980’s. turning on all the right faucets, the Chinese answer pops out at the output end of the series of pipes.” Yet, Searle thinks, obviously, “the man certainly doesn’t understand Chinese, and neither do the water pipes.” “The problem with the brain simulator,” as Searle diagnoses it, is that it simulates “only the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings”: the insufficiency of this formal structure for producing meaning and mental states “is shown by the water pipe example” (1980a, p. 421). On the usual understanding, the Chinese room experiment subserves this derivation by “shoring up axiom 3” (Churchland & Churchland 1990, p. 34). This too, Searle says, misses the point: it “trivializes the project of Strong AI by redefining it as whatever artificially produces and explains cognition” abandoning “the original claim made on behalf of artificial intelligence” that “mental processes are computational processes over formally defined elements.” If AI is not identified with that “precise, well defined thesis,” Searle says, “my objections no longer apply because there is no longer a testable hypothesis for them to apply to” (1980a, p. 422). , The Chinese Room is also the name of a British independent video game development studio best known for working on experimental first-person games, such as Everybody's Gone to the Rapture, or Dear Esther.. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org  Alan Turing introduced the test in 1950 to help answer the question "can machines think?" He doesn't intend to solve the problem of other minds (for machines or people) and he doesn't think we need to. Several critics believe that Searle's argument relies entirely on intuitions. This Chinese Room thought experiment was a response to the Turing Test. The Chinese Room Argument had an unusual beginning and an even more unusual history. Critics of Searle's response argue that the program has allowed the man to have two minds in one head.[who?] According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. He writes that "instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks. Newell and Simon had conjectured that a physical symbol system (such as a digital computer) had all the necessary machinery for "general intelligent action", or, as it is known today, artificial general intelligence. This is unfortunate, I think. This, according to those who make this reply, shows that Searle's argument fails to prove that "strong AI" is false. 1980b. The brain arguments in particular deny strong AI if they assume that there is no simpler way to describe the mind than to create a program that is just as mysterious as the brain was. Nils Nilsson writes "If a program behaves as if it were multiplying, most of us would say that it is, in fact, multiplying. David Cole describes this as the "internalist" approach to meaning. The nub of the experiment, according to Searle’s attempted clarification, then, is this: “instantiating a program could not be constitutive of intentionality, because it would be possible for an agent [e.g., Searle-in-the-room] to instantiate the program and still not have the right kind of intentionality” (Searle 1980b, pp. This discussion includes several noteworthy threads. On the other hand, such a lookup table would be ridiculously large (to the point of being physically impossible), and the states could therefore be extremely specific. It has been heavily criticized that it is not the English-speaking human inside the room that acts as a computer but rather the room as a whole, with the human as a kind of central processing unit. “Searle on what only brains can do.”, Hauser, Larry. Beginning with objections published along with Searle’s original (1980a) presentation, opinions have drastically divided, not only about whether the Chinese room argument is cogent; but, among those who think it is, as to why it is; and, among those who think it is not, as to why not.  Biological naturalism is similar to identity theory (the position that mental states are "identical to" or "composed of" neurological events); however, Searle has specific technical objections to identity theory. Therefore, he concludes that the "strong AI" hypothesis is false. , There are some critics, such as Hanoch Ben-Yami, who argue that the Chinese room cannot simulate all the abilities of a digital computer, such as being able to determine the current time. Trans. Still, Searle insists, obviously, none of these individuals understands; and neither does the whole company of them collectively. These replies address the key ontological issues of mind vs. body and simulation vs. reality. The argument asks the reader to imagine a computer that is programmed to understand how to read and communicate in Chinese. In the terminology of the time we were called Sloan Rangers. [ai], Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig argue that, if we accept Searle's description of intentionality, consciousness and the mind, we are forced to accept that consciousness is epiphenomenal: that it "casts no shadow", that it is undetectable in the outside world. In short, Searle's "causal properties" and consciousness itself is undetectable, and anything that cannot be detected either does not exist or does not matter.. Searle’s Chinese Room experiment parodies the Turing test, a test for artificial intelligence proposed by Alan Turing (1950) and echoing René Descartes’ suggested means for distinguishing thinking souls from unthinking automata. Ned Block's Blockhead argument suggests that the program could, in theory, be rewritten into a simple lookup table of rules of the form "if the user writes S, reply with P and goto X". . If Searle's room can't pass the Turing test then there is no other digital technology that could pass the Turing test. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. . The connectionist reply emphasizes that a working artificial intelligence system would have to be as complex and as interconnected as the human brain. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. Searle counters that this Connectionist Reply—incorporating, as it does, elements of both systems and brain-simulator replies—can, like these predecessors, be decisively defeated by appropriately tweaking the thought-experimental scenario. He wrote: I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. (The issue of simulation is also discussed in the article synthetic intelligence. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper.. He … In his essay Can Computers Think?, Searle gives his own definition of strong artificial intelligence, which he subsequently tries to refute. And so seems that, in recent … All of the replies that identify the mind in the room are versions of "the system reply". . These arguments, if accepted, prevent Searle from claiming that his conclusion is obvious by undermining the intuitions that his certainty requires. ), These replies provide an explanation of exactly who it is that understands Chinese. The Chinese room has a design analogous to that of a modern computer. So, when a computer responds to some tricky questions by a human, it can be concluded, in accordance with Searle, that we are communicating with the programmer, the person who gave the computer, a certain set of instructions … "[b], Although it was originally presented in reaction to the statements of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, it is not an argument against the goals of mainstream AI research, because it does not limit the amount of intelligence a machine can display. That their behavior seems to evince thought is why there is a problem about AI in the first place; and if Searle’s argument merely discountenances theoretic or metaphysical identification of thought with computation, the behavioral evidence – and consequently Turing’s point – remains unscathed. Searle responds that such a mind is, at best, a simulation, and writes: "No one supposes that computer simulations of a five-alarm fire will burn the neighborhood down or that a computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched. In his so-called “Chinese-room argument,” Searle attempted to show that there is more to thinking than this kind of rule-governed manipulation of symbols. The systems reply grants that “the individual who is locked in the room does not understand the story” but maintains that “he is merely part of a whole system, and the system does understand the story” (1980a, p. 419: my emphases). Nevertheless, Searle frequently and vigorously protests that he is not any sort of dualist. Perhaps he protests too much. “Reply to Jacquette.”, Searle, John. If Searle's room could pass the Turing test, but still does not have a mind, then the Turing test is not sufficient to determine if the room has a "mind". ("I don't speak a word of Chinese," he points out.) 1950. According to these replies,[who?] In reply to this second sort of objection, Searle insists that what’s at issue here is intrinsic intentionality in contrast to the merely derived intentionality of inscriptions and other linguistic signs. ‘The Chinese room' experiment is what is termed by physicists a ‘thought experiment' (Reynolds and Kates, 1995); such that it is a hypothetical experiment which is not physically performed, often without any intention of the experiment ever being executed. But they make the mistake of supposing that the computational model of consciousness is somehow conscious. These replies attempt to answer the question: since the man in the room doesn't speak Chinese, where is the "mind" that does? To each of these suggestions, Searle's response is the same: no matter how much knowledge is written into the program and no matter how the program is connected to the world, he is still in the room manipulating symbols according to rules. The Chinese Room thought experiment is an analogy to artificial intelligence.A person who can't speak Chinese is sitting in a room text chatting in Chinese. " Computationalism[j] is the position in the philosophy of mind which argues that the mind can be accurately described as an information-processing system. To Searle, as a philosopher investigating in the nature of mind and consciousness, these are the relevant mysteries. I do not understand a word of the Chinese stories. If the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it follows, says Searle, that he would do so as well, simply by running the program manually. It is simply not possible to divine whether a conscious agency or some clever simulation inhabits the room. His actions are syntactic and this can never explain to him what the symbols stand for. The Chinese Room (CR) is a thought experiment intended to prove that a computer cannot have a mental life with a strong sense of intelligence alike to one that humans possess because a computer does … AI systems can be used to explain the mind; The study of the brain is irrelevant to the study of the mind; Mental states are computational states (which is why computers can have mental states and help to explain the mind); Since implementation is unimportant, the only empirical data that matters is how the system functions; hence the, Those which demonstrate how meaningless symbols can become meaningful, Those which suggest that the Chinese room should be redesigned in some way, Those which contend that Searle's argument is misleading, Those which argue that the argument makes false assumptions about subjective conscious experience and therefore proves nothing, John Preston and Mark Bishop, "Views into the Chinese Room", Oxford University Press, 2002.  The centerpiece of the argument is a thought experiment known as the Chinese room. Imagine Searle-in-the-room, then, to be just one of very many agents, all working in parallel, each doing their own small bit of processing (like the many neurons of the brain).  The system reply only makes sense (to Searle) if one assumes that any "system" can have consciousness, just by virtue of being a system with the right behavior and functional parts. Since computers seem, on the face of things, to think, the conclusion that the essential nonidentity of thought with computation would seem to warrant is that whatever else thought essentially is, computers have this too; not, as Searle maintains, that computers’ seeming thought-like performances are bogus. Searle argues that however the program is written or however the machine is connected to the world, the mind is being simulated by a simple step-by-step digital machine (or machines). [c] Searle calls the first position "strong AI" and the latter "weak AI".[d]. Another tack notices that the symbols Searle-in-the-room processes are not meaningless ciphers, they’re Chinese inscriptions. Alma College Includes chapters by, This page was last edited on 28 November 2020, at 22:54. . Philosopher John Searle's famous Chinese room argument (CRA) contends that regardless of a computer's observable inputs and outputs, no type of program could by itself enable a computer to think internally like a human. , Searle's argument has become "something of a classic in cognitive science", according to Harnad. Searle also ascribes the following claims to advocates of strong AI: In more recent presentations of the Chinese room argument, Searle has identified "strong AI" as "computer functionalism" (a term he attributes to Daniel Dennett). Imagine, the argument goes, that someone is locked inside a room. Some replies to Searle begin by arguing that the room, as described, cannot have a Chinese-speaking mind. “Searle’s Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument.”, Jackson, Frank. Searle writes: "I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing.". . These replies address Searle's concerns about intentionality, symbol grounding and syntax vs. semantics. If we “put a computer inside a robot” so as to “operate the robot in such a way that the robot does something very much like perceiving, walking, moving about,” however, then the “robot would,” according to this line of thought, “unlike Schank’s computer, have genuine understanding and other mental states” (1980a, p. 420). (4) Since Searle argues against identity theory, on independent grounds, elsewhere (e.g., 1992, Ch. So they are meaningful; and so is Searle’s processing of them in the room; whether he knows it or not. (C4) The way that human brains actually produce mental phenomena cannot be solely by virtue of running a computer program. (A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics). 1980a. Ned Block writes "Searle's argument depends for its force on intuitions that certain entities do not think. But, even though I disagree with him, his simulation is pretty good, so I'm willing to credit him with real thought. Searle's "strong AI" should not be confused with "strong AI" as defined by Ray Kurzweil and other futurists, who use the term to describe machine intelligence that rivals or exceeds human intelligence. To show that thought is not just computation (what the Chinese room — if it shows anything — shows) is not to show that computers’ intelligent seeming performances are not real thought (as the “strong” “weak” dichotomy suggests) . Since they can't detect causal properties, they can't detect the existence of the mental. He presented the first version in 1984. , Colin McGinn argues that the Chinese room provides strong evidence that the hard problem of consciousness is fundamentally insoluble. Searle's "Chinese Room" thought experiment was used to demonstrate that computers do not have an understanding of Chinese in the way that a Chinese speaker does; they have a syntax but no semantics. Having laid out the example and drawn the aforesaid conclusion, Searle considers several replies offered when he “had the occasion to present this example to a number of workers in artificial intelligence” (1980a, p. 419). This assumption, he argues, is not tenable given our experience of consciousness. 1980. . They propose this analogous thought experiment: Stevan Harnad is critical of speed and complexity replies when they stray beyond addressing our intuitions. Several replies argue that Searle's argument is irrelevant because his assumptions about the mind and consciousness are faulty. Chinese Room Argument was mainly given to show that computation over any kind of representation will lack understanding. of the system” by memorizing the rules and script and doing the lookups and other operations in their head. The Chinese Room Argument can be refuted in one sentence: Searle confuses the mental qualities of one computational process, himself for example, with those of another process that the first process might be interpreting, a process that understands Chinese, for example. David Cole writes that "the Chinese Room argument has probably been the most widely discussed philosophical argument in cognitive science to appear in the past 25 years". The whole point of the thought experiment is to put someone inside the room, where they can directly observe the operations of consciousness. But in imagining himself to be the person in the room, Searle thinks it’s “quite obvious . It is also equivalent to the formal systems used in the field of mathematical logic. The Chinese Room argument is an argument against the thesis that a machine that can pass a Turing Test can be considered intelligent. The argument and thought-experiment now generally known as the Chinese Room Argument was first published in a paper in 1980 by American philosopher John Searle (1932-). Each water connection corresponds to a synapse in the Chinese brain, and the whole system is rigged up so that after doing all the right firings, that is after turning on all the right faucets, the Chinese answers pop out at the output end of the series of pipes. Each simply follows a program, step-by-step, producing a behavior which is then interpreted by the user as demonstrating intelligent conversation. These machines are always just like the man in the room: they understand nothing and don't speak Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. [NOTE: Searle actually believes that his argument works against "non-classical" computers as well, but it is best to start with the digital computers with which we are all most familiar.] ", The claim is implicit in some of the statements of early AI researchers and analysts. One tack, taken by Daniel Dennett (1980), among others, decries the dualistic tendencies discernible, for instance, in Searle’s methodological maxim “always insist on the first-person point of view” (Searle 1980b, p. 451). 450-451: my emphasis); the intrinsic kind. Clearly, whether that inference is valid or not turns on a metaphysical question about the identity of persons and minds. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.”. , Searle argues that this is only true for an observer outside of the room. Roughly speaking, we have four sorts of hypotheses here on offer.  Searle holds that the brain is, in fact, a machine, but that the brain gives rise to consciousness and understanding using machinery that is non-computational. Specifically, the argument is intended to refute a position Searle calls strong AI: "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds. Its internal states and processes, being purely syntactic, lack semantics (meaning); so, it doesn’t really have intentional (that is, meaningful) mental states. David Cole writes "From the intuition that in the CR thought experiment he would not understand Chinese by running a program, Searle infers that there is no understanding created by running a program. " The primary mission of artificial intelligence research is only to create useful systems that act intelligently, and it does not matter if the intelligence is "merely" a simulation. "Understanding" in this sense is simply understanding Chinese. Several of the replies above also address the specific issue of complexity. “Epiphenomenal qualia.”. (5) If Searle’s positive views are basically dualistic – as many believe – then the usual objections to dualism apply, other-minds troubles among them; so, the “other-minds” reply can hardly be said to “miss the point.” Indeed, since the question of whether computers (can) think just is an other-minds question, if other minds questions “miss the point” it’s hard to see how the Chinese room speaks to the issue of whether computers really (can) think at all. It has become one of the best-known arguments in recent philosophy. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong AI, Searle says, “the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind, rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states” (1980a, p. 417). ", Some of the arguments above also function as appeals to intuition, especially those that are intended to make it seem more plausible that the Chinese room contains a mind, which can include the robot, commonsense knowledge, brain simulation and connectionist replies. . He presented the first version in 1984. He did not, however, intend for the test to measure for the presence of "consciousness" or "understanding". Though Searle unapologetically identifies intrinsic intentionality with conscious intentionality, still he resists Dennett’s and others’ imputations of dualism. Replies Syntax is indeed sufficient for semantics.  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